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The crusade of transitional justice: 
tracing the journeys of hegemonic claims
Astrid Jamar 
143
 
Engaging with Third World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL), this paper reviews the 
crusade of transitional justice by tracing the journeys of problematic claims across the world. 
Building on original empirical material, I document the dissemination of specific sets of claims 
as well as their hegemonic functions through a systematic review of the transitional justice 
provisions contained in all peace agreements signed since 1990. I centre on the epistemic violence144 
perpetuated through this normative crusade. The crusade and limitation of disseminated claims 
neglect the inevitable arguments about the past, frictions between legal ‘global standards’, the 
resulting technocratic practices and the often-silenced politicised negotiations taking place through 
transitional justice practices. Gradually, the consolidation of hegemonic approaches took over 
institutional debates addressing legacies of mass violence and, consequently, silencing certain types 
of violence. In other words, I argue that transitional justice is simultaneously: 1) an increasingly 
normative and technocratic field that claims to deal with legacies of violent pasts for democratic 
futures, 2) a set of processes that silences normative and discursive battles about a violent past and 
perpetuates epistemic violence. 
In policy settings, transitional justice efforts are mostly perceived as tools to account for legacies 
of mass violence, to end authoritarianism and hence to contribute to liberal democracy. From 
post-colonial theoretical grounds, TWAIL clarifies the role of international law that sustains 
unequal structures and maintains the growing North-South divide145 and historical association 
of international human rights law with colonial conquest and Western domination in Africa.146 
TWAIL also denounces contemporary ideology’s assumption that liberal institutions and 
international human rights norms can tackle issues of abuse of power and authoritarianism. 
To quote Sripati, TWAIL is an intellectual endeavour that ‘assails the creation and perpetuation 
of international law as a “racialised hierarchy” of international norms and institutions that 
subordinate the third world by the first world’.147 The application of such a twailean perspective 
to transitional justice projects the image of an increasingly professionalised industry that 
deploys fact-finding, training and reporting activities that seek accountability and aim to provide 
reparations to victims, ultimately to achieve sustainable peace and democratisation to redress 
143 For over a decade, Astrid Jamar’s research has focused on transitional justice and international aid in the African Great Lakes region. 
From 2008 to 2011, she worked with several international and local NGOs in Rwanda and Burundi, implementing transitional justice 
processes in the two countries. From 2015 to 2019, she contributed to the consolidation of a vast peace agreements database with the 
Political Settlement Research Programme, University of Edinburgh. The author wishes to thank her PRSP colleagues, particularly Sanja 
Bandajak, for their insightful comments on earlier versions of this essay. This research was funded by UK Aid from the UK Department for 
International Development (DFID).
144 Building on Dos Santos’ concept of ‘epistemicide’ and Steve Biko’s praxis of Black Consciousness, Madlingozi argues that the ‘Global 
Transitional Justice Project (GTJP) is one of the most effective vehicles for the imposition of Western epistemologies and, conversely, the 
re-inferiorisation of ‘non-Western’ epistemologies and ways of being in the world; that is, a way of perpetuating epistemicide. The GTJP 
is, therefore, a key mechanism in buttressing the coloniality of power, knowledge and being. Understood in this way, in historically settler 
colonies the GTJP ultimately facilitates a transition from settler domination to settler hegemony.’ See T. Madlingozi (2015), ‘Transitional 
Justice as Epistemicide: on Steve Biko’s Pluralist Co-existence “after” Conflict’, Seminar, Wits Institute for Social and Economic Research, 
Witwatersrand University, 7 July. 
145 B. S. Chimni (2006), ‘Third World Approaches to International Law: A Manifesto’. International Community Law Review, 8:3.
146 See, Madlingozi, ‘Transitional Justice as Epistemicide’; M. Mutua (2000), ‘Politics and Human Rights: An Essential Symbiosis’, in M. Byers 
(2001), The Role of Law in International Politics, Oxford University Press, pp. 149–76; and M. Mutua (2001), ‘Savages, Victims, and Saviors: 
The Metaphor of Human Rights’, Harvard International Law Journal, 42:201. 
147 V. Sripati (2008), ‘The United Nation’s Role in Post-Conflict Constitution-Making Processes: TWAIL Insights’, International Community Law 
Review, 10 (4): pp. 411–20. 
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conflict-affected or ‘broken’ societies.148 In such technocratic interventions, the professional 
elites of transitional justice disseminate and consolidate a contentious normative framework that 
neglects (and hence reproduces) unequal power dynamics. From such perspectives, the transitional 
justice normative crusade enables token democracies to be consolidated and epistemic violence  
to be inflicted.
Consolidation of hegemonic packages: norms that inflict epistemic violence 
The field of transitional justice emerged out of debates addressing how the Latin American and 
former Yugoslav countries experienced political transitions from authoritarian rule to democracy.149 
Over the last decades, the field was transformed from unsettled debates interrogating which 
approach would be best150 to a hegemonic package standardising normative claims and routinising 
institutional practices.151 In order to trace the dissemination of transitional justice norms at a global 
scale, I reviewed all transitional justice provisions in the 1518 peace agreements signed between 
1990 and 2015 in 80 countries, across 140 peace processes.152 Of these 1518, 760 agreements entail 
some form of commitment to deal with legacies of past violence. With an interest in institutional 
and normative claims, this paper narrows down its focus to the 102 agreements that provide for a 
non-judicial mechanism, i.e. providing for an institution of some sort to ‘deal with the past’.153
The texts of peace agreements document how such ‘global’ standards get integrated into specific 
peace processes across the world, as illustrated in Graph 1. The flowers on the world map indicate 
the countries for which peace agreements contain transitional justice mechanisms commitments.154 
The 20 examples in lined-up boxes illustrate further the normative dissemination across space 
and time. Three key points stand out from the graph: (1) the geographic and chronological scale 
of transitional justice dissemination; (2) the direction of dissemination; (3) the similarities of the 
names of mechanisms. In contrast to literature that focuses on norms entrepreneurs that  
celebrates such dissemination,155 I clarify here how the direction and the normative content of 
such a crusade are relevant to depict the epistemic violence emerging from such hegemonic and 
normative consolidation.
148 See V. Nesiah (2016), ‘Theories of Transitional Justice: Cashing in the Blue Chips’, in A. Oford, F. Hoffman and M. Clark (2016), The Oxford 
Handbook of the Theories of International Law, Oxford University Press; T. Madlingozi (2010), ‘On Transitional Justice Entrepreneurs and 
the Production of Victims’, Journal of Human Rights Practice, 2 (2); and T. Madlingozi (2016), ‘Transitional Justice as Epistemicide: on Steve 
Biko’s Pluralist Co-existence “after” Conflict’, Conference Paper, ISA Annual Meeting, San Francisco. 
149 See M. Albon (1995), ‘Truth and Justice: The Delicate Balance – Documentation of Prior Regimes and Individual Rights’, in N. Kritz (ed.) 
(1995), Transitional Justice: How Emerging Democracies Reckon with Former Regimes, United States Institute of Peace Press; and N. Kritz 
and N. Mandela (1995), ‘Country Studies’ in N. Kritz (ed.) (1995), Transitional Justice: How Emerging Democracies Reckon with Former 
Regimes, United States Institute of Peace Press. 
150 R. Siegel (1998), ‘Transitional Justice: A Decade of Debate and Experience’, Human Rights Quarterly, 20 (2). 
151 V. Nesiah (2016), ‘Theories of Transitional Justice: Cashing in the Blue Chips’, in A. Oford, F. Hoffman and M. Clark (2016), The Oxford 
Handbook of the Theories of International Law, Oxford University Press
152 Using the provisions related to transitional justice mechanisms coded geographically and chronologically, I re-coded these provisions 
with further thematic sub-categories into Nvivo (a qualitative data analysis computer software). As a part of the team of the Political 
Settlements Research Programme, I was responsible for the transitional justice theme in the construction of PA-X. The peace agreement 
database is fully accessible: <https://www.peaceagreements.org/> 
153 C. Bell, S. Badanjak, R. Forster, A. Jamar, J. Pospisil and L. Wise (2017), ‘PA-X Codebook, Version 1’, Political Settlements Research 
Programme, University of Edinburgh. 
154 Each flower represents one agreement, some countries have several agreements containing transitional justice provisions, and hence 
several flowers. 
155 Literature that celebrates the successful cascade of human rights norms e.g. M. Finnemore and K. Sikkink (1998), ‘International Norm 
Dynamics and Political Change’, International Organization, Vol. 52, No. 4: pp. 887–917. 
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Graph 1: World map of commitments to transitional justice mechanisms contained in peace agreements 
National Reconciliation  
Committee, Madagascar, 2009
PA-X, Peace Agreement Access Tool – © University of Edinburgh  
The upper visualising map was created by Mengting Bao
Commission for Truth and  
Reconciliation, Indonesia,  
2005
National Peace and  
Rehabilitation Commission, 
Nepal, 2006
Working Group on  
National Reconciliation 
and Transitional Justice  
 
Sa’adah Reconstruction  
Fund, Yemen, 2014
Transitional Justice and  
Reconciliation Commission,  
Philippines – Mindanao, 2014
Commission of Inquiry, 
South Africa, 1991
National Unity and  
Reconciliation Commission
Joint Commission 
to trace missing persons  
and mortal remains,  
Croatia, 1991
Truth Commission,  
Columbia, 1991
Commission on  
the Truth, El  
Salvador, 1991
National 
Reconciliation  
Commission 
Guatemala, 1991
Clarification  
Commission 
Guatemala, 1994
The Verification  
and Truth  
Commission,  
Honduras, 2009
Comprehensive  
System if Truth,  
Justice, Reparation  
and Non-Repetition, 
Columbia, 2015
Truth and Reconciliation  
Commission, Sierra Leone, 1999
Historical Investigations Unit 
Independent Commission 
on Information Retrieval  
 
Orla History Archive,  
Northern Ireland/Ireland/UK
Truth and  
Reconciliation 
Commission,  
DRC, 2002 
Truth and Reconciliation 
Committee,  
Sudan/South Sudan, 
2009
Truth Justice and  
Reconciliation  
Committee,  
Kenya, 2008
Violence and Democracy
56
The direction of transitional justice dissemination displays a geographic discrepancy towards 
the Global South.156 Transitional justice commitments expand from Latin America (Guatemala, 
Salvador and Colombia) in the early 1990s to Europe (e.g. Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1992, Georgia 
– Abkhazia – Russia, and Croatia, Tajikistan and Kosovo in the late 1990s, and Northern Ireland 
in 2001 and 2003). After that, there is no transitional justice provision in any peace agreement 
related to a European country until 2014. On the African continent, the transitional mechanisms 
spread from South Africa to Mali, Rwanda, Somaliland, Burundi, Gabon, Niger, Uganda, Sierra 
Leone, Comoros, Eritrea-Ethiopia, DRC, etc. Africa became the continent with the most countries 
establishing transitional justice mechanisms. In the Middle East, peace agreements committed to 
establish similar mechanisms in Iraq in 2004, in Bahrain in 2011, and in Yemen in 2014. In the Asia 
and Pacific region, transitional justice mechanisms were introduced in Indonesia and the Solomon 
Islands in 2001, in the Philippines in 2002, in Sri Lanka in 2003, and in Nepal and Pakistan in 2006. 
Commenting on the historical discrepancy of human rights scrutiny and knowledge production 
being slanted towards the Third World, Okafor states: such a geographic trajectory ‘helps to foster a 
racialised hierarchy in which Third World societies are endemically and perpetually viewed as the 
sites of human rights violations’.157 A clear parallel can be drawn for the direction of the normative 
dissemination: transitional justice commitments expanded from the endogenous appearance of 
transitional justice efforts in Latin American peripheries to a global hegemony which gradually 
disseminated to the East and mushroomed speedily and predominantly in Africa. 
To clarify these normative commitments, I coded what peace agreements texts actually provide 
for in terms of the type of mechanism, the set aims, and the actions that allegedly connect such 
institutional frameworks with the aims set. The names of these mechanisms contain different 
combinations of the transitional justice global ‘toolkit’ and suggest an inherent complementarity 
between these elements (i.e. reconciliation, justice, healing, truth): National Unity and 
Reconciliation Commission (Sierra Leone, 1996), National Peace and Rehabilitation Commission 
(Nepal, 2006), Justice, Truth and Reconciliation Commission (Sudan, Darfur, 2011), National 
Reconciliation Commission (DRC, 2013), Commission for Truth, Reconciliation and Healing (South 
Sudan, 2014), Comprehensive Process for Reconciliation and Healing (Philippines, Mindanao, 2014), 
Transitional Justice and Reconciliation Commission (Philippines, Mindanao, 2014).  
 
 
156 The nature of the empirical evidence used to document such dissemination (peace agreements) increases such difference. Excluding all 
transitional justice institutions established outside of peace agreements also excludes several transitional justice mechanisms in Western 
countries. Transitional Justice in Balance, which draws on global databases, still projects a similar discrepancy (Tricia D. Olsen, Leigh A. 
Payne and Andrew G. Reiter (2010) Transitional Justice in Balance: Comparing Processes, Weighing Efficacy, USIP Press).
157 O. C. Okafor (2014), ‘International Human Rights Fact-Finding Praxis in Its Living Forms: A TWAIL Perspective’, Transnational Human Rights 
Review, 1:59. 
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Mechanism types Actions Aims
Truth 44 Fact finding – investigate 71 For reconciliation 27
Inquiry 26 Produce report 19 For non-repetition 19
Reconciliation 9 Clarify events – history 16 To investigate events 9
Reparations 6 Compensate victims 9 To heal 8
Genocide prevention 3 Efforts to fight against 
impunity
8 For accountability 5
Tradition 3 Treat claims 8 For justice 5
Justice 2 Address human rights  
violations
7 To repair harm caused 5
Peace 1 Bring guilty to justice – punish 7 For rehabilitation 4
Gender 1 Qualify crimes 6 For forgiveness 3
  Truth-telling 6 For reparation 3
  Civic, peace and reconciliation 
education
4 For rule of law consolidation 2
  Apply vetting or sanctions 4 To end impunity 2
  Rehabilitate victims of 
genocide
3 For co-existence 1
 Work out a TJ programme 3 For institutional reforms 1
  Adopt legislation against 
genocide
2 For truth 1
  Organise consultations 2 To monitor society  
(prevention)
1
  Establish inter-ethnic front to 
resist genocide
2 To strengthen democracy 1
  Make public apology 2   
  Undertake regional monitoring 
for genocide prevention
2   
  Report events 2   
  Organise cleansing ritual 1   
  Fight against discrimination 1   
  Rewrite history 1   
  Assure the security of  
witnesses and victims
1   
 
 
Table 1: List and numbers of mechanism type, actions and aims included in peace agreements in 
relation to non-judicial (transitional justice) mechanisms
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By listing the types of mechanisms, actions and aims in order of frequency, the table shows the 
most common elements: of 95 mechanisms, 44 are some form of truth commission (46%) and 26 are 
inquiry commissions (27%). In terms of specific actions, fact-finding and investigative activities are 
by far the most provided for in peace agreements (included in 71 peace agreements). The production 
of a report (in 19 agreements) and efforts to clarify events related to past violence (in 16 agreements) 
are also relatively frequent. The texts of peace agreements relate these different institutions and 
activities to various aims, most importantly to reconciliation and non-repetition. The provisions 
for other forms of institutions or activities exist but are much less frequent, as illustrated by the 
numbers at the lower ends of these three lists. Another noticeable element is the lack of articulations 
of how these institutions should achieve the set aims. On the contrary, the dissemination of such 
similar approaches consolidates contested claims: fact-finding, investigations or the production of 
reports would lead to reconciliation or non-repetition. 
While the complementarity between different elements of transitional justice is increasingly 
contested,158 extensive research criticises the field of transitional justice for the claimed benefits 
attached to truth-seeking initiatives, its reconciling, healing or preventive functions.159 Such 
institutional practices have also been criticised for favouring specific accounts of violence while 
silencing others.160 Denouncing the hegemonic functions of transitional justice, Nesiah observes 
that ‘assumptions are normalised and institutional practices routinised in ways that have 
consolidated rather than troubled the field’, instead of being challenged, revisited or defined.161 
For Madlingozi, the normative dimension of such hegemonic packages is ‘one of the most effective 
vehicles for the imposition of western epistemologies, and, conversely, the re-inferiorisation 
of “non-western” epistemologies and ways of being in the world; that is, a way of perpetuating 
epistemicide’.162 Similarly, this global review of transitional justice commitments draws attention to 
the hegemonic functions of such normative and geographic dissemination. Instead of a celebratory 
normative cascade, I depict a normative crusade that consolidated contested normative claims 
and disseminated them across the Global South. In other words, transitional expertise brought in 
peace mediation contributed to the production of such normative knowledge. On a global scale, 
this inflicts epistemic violence by silencing necessary, politically difficult and unsettled debates to 
address legacies of mass violence.  
 
It is crucial to read such observations with the implementation of transitional justice efforts in 
specific contexts to grasp the political functions of the normative package. As argued elsewhere,163 
the Burundian and Rwandan cases present contexts where ambitious transitional justice agendas 
158 See P. Naftali (2015), ‘The Politics of Truth: On Legal Fetishism and the Rhetoric of Complementarity’, Revue Québecoise de Droit 
International, Special Education Review, 101; B. A. Leebaw (2008), ‘The Irreconcilable Goals of Transitional Justice’, Human Rights 
Quarterly, 30 (1); S. Lefranc and G. Mouralis (2014), ‘De Quel(s) Droit(s) la Justice Internationale est-elle Faite? Deux Moments de la 
Constitution Hésitante d’une Justice de l’après-Conflit’, La Nouvelle Revue des Sciences Sociales, No.3; K. McEvoy (2018), ‘Travel, Dilemmas 
and Nonrecurrence: Observations on the “Respectablisation” of Transnational Justice’, International Journal of Transitional Justice, 12 (2), 
pp. 185–93. 
159 See L. Fletcher and H. Weinstein (2002), ‘Violence and Social Repair: Rethinking the Contribution of Justice to Reconciliation’, Human 
Rights Quarterly, 24 (3); D. Mendeloff (2004), ‘Truth-Seeking, Truth-Telling, and Postconflict Peacebuilding: Curb the Enthusiasm?’, 
International Studies Review, 6 (3); R. Shaw (2005), Rethinking Truth and Reconciliation Commissions: Lessons from Sierra Leone, United 
States Institute of Peace, Special Report, No. 130; J. E. Burnet (2009), ‘Whose Genocide? Whose Truth, Representations of Victim and 
Perpetrator in Rwanda’, in A.L. Hinton and K.L. O’Neill (eds) Genocide: Truth, Memory and Representation, Duke University Press; B. M. 
French (2009), ‘Technologies of Telling: Discourse, Transparency, and Erasure in Guatemalan Truth Commission Testimony’, Journal of 
Human Rights, 8 (1), pp. 92–109; and F. C. Ross (2003), ‘On Having a Voice and Being Heard: Some after-Effects of Testifying before the 
South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission’, Anthropological Theory, 3 (3). 
160 See Fletcher and Weinstein, ‘Violence and Social Repair’; Mendeloff, ‘Truth-Seeking, Truth-Telling, and Postconflict Peacebuilding’; J. N. 
Clark (2008), ‘The Three Rs: Redistributive Justice, Restorative Justice, and Reconciliation’, Contemporary Justice Review, 11 (4); Nesiah, 
‘Theories of Transitional Justice’; T. Madlingozi (2010), ‘On Transitional Justice Entrepreneurs and the Production of Victims’, Journal of 
Human Rights Practice, 2 (2); and P. Naftali (2017), ‘La Construction “Du Droit à la Vérité” En Droit International’, Bruylant.
161 Nesiah, ‘Theories of Transitional Justice’.
162 Madlingozi, ‘Transitional Justice as Epistemicide’.
163 See A. Jamar (2014), ‘Training in Transitional Justice in Rwanda and Burundi’, L’Afrique Des Grands Lacs, Annuaire 2013–14, L’Harmattan; 
A. Jamar (2016), ‘The Social Life of Policy Reports: Reporting as Tool for the Transitional Justice Battlefield’, Pending Review; A. Jamar 
(2016), ‘Transitional Justice Battlefield – Practitioners Working around Policy and Practice in Burundi and Rwanda’, PhD Dissertation 
in International Development, University of Sussex; and A. Jamar (2018), ‘Victims’ Inclusion and Transitional Justice: Attending to the 
Exclusivity of Inclusion Politics’, PSRP Report, Transitional Justice Series. 
Violence and Democracy
59
have been promoted. These two neighbouring nations of the African Great Lakes region are still 
evolving towards authoritarianism. Such transitional justice efforts, or technocratic interventions, 
are not just taking place within a general context of token democratic practices (i.e. organisation 
of elections, referendums, participatory reforms for good governance, etc.) that consolidate 
authoritarianism. These two transitional justice processes also entailed inclusive and participatory 
dimensions to seek stronger legitimacy and increase their own democratic appearance (i.e. 
involvement of lay judges and community participation in Gacaca procedures in Rwanda, national 
consultations in Burundi). In the two cases, extensive political battles took place between and 
within the various national and international organisations involved in the two processes when 
framing the meta-narrative about violence. Additionally, technocratic battles have been taking place 
through disagreements over the mandate and procedures of Gacaca Law or the legal framework of 
the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in Burundi, on top of the political arguments over their 
implementation. All these battles have been silenced through references to the normative and 
technocratic dimensions of transitional justice. 
In short, transitional justice efforts adopt a technocratic discourse that silences other voices 
and inherent political battles while diverting attention from contemporary use of violence and 
oppression towards political opponents. As demonstrated by tracing the transitional justice crusade, 
the required expertise and epistemic hegemony contributes to structural violence as 1) it reproduces 
inequalities and injustices without addressing core structural issues related to perpetuated 
violence; 2) it creates impunity for global (essentially Western) contributions to the consequences 
of authoritarianism and/or mass violence under scrutiny by transitional justice efforts; 3) it 
depoliticises efforts dealing with the past and hence creates ideal hooks for political manipulation 
by both global and domestic factors; 4) it continues to project a vision of the world where the 
North is portrayed as an international saviour and the Global South depicted as home to broken 
societies. Simply put, rather than consolidating liberal democracies, the crusade of transitional 
justice produces epistemic violence through the consolidation of elite cohorts and pre-formatted 
technocratic solutions to ‘broken societies’ 
